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INTRODUCTION 
The Sri Lankan public service has more than half a century of 
experience of combined land colonisation and irrigation develop-
ment projects in the Dry Zone. A considerable fund of expertise 
has been built up. Most of the policy issues raised below have 
been widely debated within the country, and in some cases alternative 
methods and procedures have been tested. It follows that the 
scope for doing things better is not always as large as it appears 
at first sight. A great deal of effort could be wasted in ignoring 
both the lessons of experience and the narrow constraints imposed 
by political circumstances. It has been the authors® intention 
to provide a summary of the issues and a realistic assessment of 
both the degree of need and the prospects for policy changes in the 
subject areas discussed. 
1. BACKGROUND AND OBJECTIVES 
Sri Lanka's population is heavily concentrated in the southwestern 
corner of the Island known as the Wet Zone.1 This has been the 
case for some centuries, and was exacerbated by the location in 
the same area of the tea, rubber and coconut plantations which 
formed the basis of the Island's relative material prosperity in 
the earlier decades of this century. In the 1930s the state began 
in earnest large-scale irrigation development in the Dry Zone. 
The near-conquest of malaria in the late 19 40s provided a major 
boost to this process. 
The main initial motive for promoting colonisation, was the 
perceived social and political costs of growing rural landlessness 
in the Wet Zone. The attempt to reduce heavy dependence on 
imported rice was also a motive, but not dominant. The repopulation 
of the historic heartland of Sinhalese civilisation.was and remains 2 a prominent ideological theme. 
In the 1960s, Sri Lanka entered a period of permanent chronic 
balance of payments and unemployment problems. Increasing attention 
was given to boosting the disappointing economic returns from Dry 
Zone colonisation schemes, but this has not been very successful, 
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largely because of the poor use of irrigation water detailed 
below. 
There has been over the years a gradual shift in the physical 
nature of new projects and the purposes for which they were built. 
The earlier projects were purely irrigation/colonisation projects. 
Physically they were relatively small - irrigating less than 8000 
hectares - and self-contained, characteristically comprising an 
earth barrier ('bund') across a natural watercourse and the storage 
of water in the artificial lake ('tank') so created. Most 
involved the reconstruction of projects built by the Sinhalese 
kings more than a thousand years before. The two major projects 
which preceded the Mahaweli project - the Gal Oya and Uda Walawe 
projects - were however larger than anything attempted before, 
built on virgin sites and, above all, intended both for power 
generation and irrigation purposes. It is relevant to later 
discussion that, as irrigation projects, they have both performed 
extremely poorly and yielded very low returns on investment. Large 
areas receive no irrigation water at all. The more recent of the 
two, the Uda Walawe project, was scheduled to irrigate 33,000 
hectares, but is in fact only irrigating about 7,000 hectares. 
It is officially still unfinished, but the lack of water has meant 
that further land development has proceeded very slowly. 
The current Mahaweli project represents an accentuation of earlier 
trends in two senses. In the first place it is primarily 
concerned with power generation, in the sense that the dams 
(especially Kotmale and Victoria) have been given priority and 
represent the soundest element of the total package in terms of 
3 . . . the benefit-cost ratio. In the second place it aims to irrigate 
very large acreages. Here different sources of figures can be 
very confusing, because the term 'the Mahaweli project' is used 
in a wide variety of ways. In its broadest sense the term refers 
to a network of power and irrigation projects all involving the 
use of the water flowing in Sri Lanka's main river, the Mahaweli. 
Elements of the total programme envisaged have however already 
been completed or are under construction. Having promised in 
1977 to complete the whole of the outstanding programme in six 
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rather than thirty years, the Sri Lankan government has continually 
scaled down its targets to levels more feasible in economic and 
physical terms. The original UNDP/FAO Master Plan (1965-68) 
envisaged providing new or more reliable irrigation for 365,000 
hectares - nearly 6% of Sri Lanka's land area. Work on 90,000 
hectares is completed or under construction. It is unlikely, 
given continual downward revisions in targets, that this figure 
will be dramatically raised in the next five years. 
The distinctive physical feature of the Mahaweli project is that 
it involves the linking of a number of water basins by canal and 
tunnel and the transhipment of water for irrigation purposes over 
long distances. The headworks are mainly in the hills some distance 
from the area of irrigation and settlement. 
2. SETTLERS 
. . 4 a. Place of Origin 
The original purpose of Dry Zone settlement was the relief of Wet 
Zone landlessness. In those days the Dry Zone was very sparsely 
populated and unused land freely available. The situation has 
however changed considerably. The Dry Zone has become a much 
more attractive place since the apparent conquest of malaria some 
twenty years ago - until its recent resurgence J - and with the 
provision of public transport, education and health services and 
other facilities. A second or even third generation lives on the 
earlier colonisation schemes, and there has been considerable 
independent individual settlement in undeveloped areas. There are 
powerful demands for allotments on new settlement schemes from 
two categories of Dry Zone residents:-
(i) Those already resident in the project area. Their 
numbers have been enhanced by deliberate anticipatory encroachment 
in project areas once details of future development plans become 
known. 
(ii) Allottees on existing Dry Zone schemes, who complain 
about what is generally known as the 'second generation problem' 
- the fact that allotments are allegedly too small to divide 
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among sons. 
Even before the above two categories those people physically 
displaced from their homes by the Kotmale and Victoria dams have 
priority in land allocations in the Mahaweli scheme. 
No classification of the actual or anticipated allottees by 
place of origin is available. It is however likely that at 
best only a small proportion will come from the Wet Zone. The 
reasons are political and pressing. The result is however 
unfortunate from the point of view of both the national economy 
and the Wet Zone landless. For the general characterisation of 
the Wet Zone as a densely populated/intensive agriculture/low 
agricultural wage area and the Dry Zone as a lightly populated/ 
extensive agriculture/high wage area remains valid. The amount 
of extra output generated by additional labour (and complementary 
inputs such as draft power and fertiliser) is much higher in the 
Dry Zone than in the Wet Zone. A net transfer of labour to the 
Dry Zone should both help to boost Wet Zone wage rates and, more 
importantly, increase the total availability and use of labour 
in Dry Zone agriculture and increase agricultural output. It is 
thus in the national economic interest that the population of 
the older settlement schemes, most of them recipients of relatively 
large holdings - originally five acres of rice land and three of 
non-irrigated 'highland' - be encouraged to sub-divide their 
holdings among children and adopt labour-using and output-
increasing production practices such as transplanting and weeding. 
b. Individual Characteristics 
Most settlers on the original schemes appear to have been 
genuinely landless, partly because the Dry Zone was then so 
unpleasant that few other people could be persuaded to go or 
remain there. There have however been persistent criticisms 
that the persons chosen did not make good farmers. The increasing 
emphasis on obtaining an economic return from investment has led 
to the establishment of a formal 'points system' to assist in 
settler selection. The system attaches high priority to such 
factors as: agricultural experience; formal agricultural 
training; educational attainment; and participation in local 
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organisations. There is no evidence that these criteria 
actually select good farmers, while it is clear that they almost 
completely exclude the 'bottom 40%' of village populations - the 
barely-literate landless labourers concerned to obtain a living 
on a day-to-day basis.^ A further complication is that Members 
of Parliament now play a major role in choosing among applicants 
for allotments. It is likely that their preferences in large 
part overrule any 'points system', although their choices too 
are almost certainly biased towards the less poor political 
activists. 
Mahaweli settlers are recipients of large subsidies which, if 
not paid from foreign grants, are ultimately borne, via heavy 
taxes on tea exports, by the very poor tea estate labourers. 
These subsidies are not generally going to the poorest, although, 
equally, they do not benefit the rich. In general, it is the 
'middling' rural strata who benefit. 
THERE ARE REASONS TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE WAY SETTLERS ARE 
SELECTED. AT THE SAME TIME, PROSPECTS FOR EFFECTING ANY CHANGE 
ARE NOT GOOD. 
3. THE SETTLEMENT PROCESS 
The extent to which settlers are provided on arrival with already 
constructed houses and wells and already-levelled and developed 
land has always been a matter of balancing two main sets of 
imperatives: the desire to provide settlers with a 'good start' 
in order that they do not fall into disillusion, debt, etc; and 
pressures to minimise costs. There have been continual shifts 
in policy over the years, particularly with regard to the extent 
to which settlers have to clear, level and develop their own 
land. The provision of a house has remained standard policy. 
The current phase of the Mahaweli scheme is characterised both 
by a sense of urgency and a new spirit of experimentation induced 
by the involvement of so many expatriates and external aid donors 
In preparing for the arrival of settlers practice appears both 
flexible and continually changing. 
There is some evidence that haste is leading to poor coordination 
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of arrangements to receive new settlers, and unnecessary suffering 
and stress. 
4. THE PHYSICAL DESIGN OF SETTLEMENT SCHEMES 
a. Location of houses 
An issue which has exercised the minds of many observers is 
whether settlers' houses should be scattered and located as near 
paddy fields as possible, as on existing schemes, or whether they 
should be nucleated in some way. The proponents of nucleation 
argue (i) that this will help induce a sense of 'community' and 
social involvement which seems to have been so conspicuously 
lacking on existing schemes and (ii) that this is the only way 
in which it will become economically possible to provide settlers 
with electricity and separate domestic water supplies (see below). 
On the other hand, those concerned with the efficiency of agri-
cultural and irrigation management stress the need for the farmer 
to live as near to his paddy land as possible, especially if 
continuous rotations of irrigation water are to be practised. 
There is no evidence that settlers on existing schemes feel the 
lack of 'community involvement' which worries outside observers. 
The extent to which these alternative emphases can be accommodated 
depends in part on local topography in the settlement areas. A 
general policy decision has been taken in favour of nucleated 
units in future settlements areas, and controlled experiments 
with different arrangements are underway in the 'H' area of the 
Mahaweli Project.5 
b. 'Tops and tails' 
Although allottees start with equal land allotments and relative 
economic equality, considerable inequalities quickly develop. 
One cause lies in spatial factors. One aspect of the enormous 
range of difficulties faced in irrigation water management (see 
below) is that those with land at the heads of irrigation channels 
('top-enders') receive much more abundant and reliable supplies 
of water than those at the ends ('tail-enders'). This is a problem 
in many countries apart from Sri Lanka and cannot easily be solved. 
The economic inequality to which it gives rise is exacerbated by 
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the physical location of roads and public offices on settlement 
schemes. These are typically at or near the top end of the 
main canal. This then leads to a number of vicious circles 
for 'tail-enders'. 'Top-enders' are much closer to public 
offices and in closer contact with government officers. They 
find it easier to obtain publicly-provided scarce resources 
such as fertilisers and credit, and easier to get their parti-
cular problems with regard to irrigation water solved. Govern-
ment officials buy or rent rice land at the 'top-end' near 
their offices and homes, and thus have a vested interest in 
ensuring that the top end gets priority in the distribution of 
water. Tractor owners plough and thresh for *top-enders' first 
because their land is closer and the roads are better. Visitors 
see only the 'top-ends', and so do not appreciate the problems 
of 'tail-enders'. 
THIS PROBLEM OOULD BE CONSIDERABLY ALLEVIATED IN NEW SCHEMES 
BY LOCATING MAIN ROADS AND PUBLIC OFFICES AT 'TAIL-ENDS'. 
5. IRRIGATION 
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT IRRIGATION AND WATER MANAGEMENT CONSTITUTES 
THE SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FOR MAHAWELI. 
The technical and economic feasibility of Mahaweli depends on 
attaining much more efficient use of water than on existing 
schemes. Previous attempts to improve efficiency on other 
schemes have failed. Rates of irrigation water use vary consi-
derably, but are generally between three and six metres per year 
over the irrigated area (as measured by issues from the storage 
reservoir). The major recent feasibility study of Mahaweli 
(the NEDECO Report), indicates that this will have to be reduced 
to an average of 2% metres per year if there is to be adequate 
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water to irrigate the planned acreage. The achievement of this 
target depends crucially on persuading farmers to grow large 
acreages of crops which require less water than rice. A separate 
network of irrigation channels to non-rice areas is likely to be 
provided for this purpose. 
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The issues associated with irrigation and water management are 
difficult and both technical and political. An introduction to 
those currently relevant to Mahaweli is provided in an attached 
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paper. It is possible here only to summarise the main points: 
(i) There is in a technical sense an enormous scope for 
improving water management. The rates of use quoted 
above are in anyone's terms excessive for an environment 
in which the average annual rainfall is generally 
between 130 and 200 centimetres. Experimental projects 
demonstrate this. 
(ii) Although the causes of poor water management are complex 
and difficult to solve, there seems little doubt that 
they lie to an important degree within that section of 
the public service responsible for operating irrigation 9 
systems. Among the more obvious problems are: lack 
of adaptation of practices and procedures evolved in 
past decades (and in part in the last century) to 
contemporary conditions; the placing of irrigation 
projects in the charge of professional civil engineers 
with scarcely any training or interest in irrigation and 
agriculture, and no prospect of remaining for long on 
water management duties; the very temporary nature of 
the postings of engineers to irrigation projects, and 
their general preference for being in Colombo; the 
lack of recognition or exploitation of the skills and 
abilities of the subordinate irrigation staff who are 
attached to projects for years at a time and who in prac-
tice manage them on a day-to-day basis. 
(iii) The considerable criticisms of water management practices 
which has been voiced in the past has led to more atten-
tion being focused on this issue in Mahaweli than in 
previous developments. The most evident result is a 
more dense administrative framework. There are three 
parallel lines of field level administration in the 
Mahaweli areas, covering agriculture, community develop-
ment and irrigation respectively. However, more 
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fundamental issues have not been tackled, and 
experience to date with water management on the 
newly-settled 'H' area of Mahaweli is not very 
encouraging. 
(iv) The main single response to water management is to 
establish 'farmer groups' of various kinds at different 
levels. The influence of the fashion in development 
circles for 'participation' is strong here. While 
there is .some scope and need for farmer participation, 
this is necessarily limited when one is dealing with 
a resource like water which is scarce, easy to steal 
difficult to control. 'Participation' must take place 
within a context of clear and enforced procedures for 
the management of total systems. Past experience in 
Sri Lanka of farmer group involvement in water manage-
ment is not encouraging. Currently in Sri Lanka the idea 
of participation in water management is unlikely to be 
very successful, and may even be counter-productive, 
unless combined with more urgent complementary reforms 
of the total management system. In the first place, the 
considerable activity put into setting up farmer groups 
probably diverts attention from more basic problems. In 
the second place, the idea seems to support the erroneous 
but convenient view widespread among irrigation staff 
that it is largely farmers who are to blame for poor 
water management, and that solutions must therefore be 
found at the level of farmer behaviour, rather than at 
the level of irrigation system management. 
Cv) External engineers have considerable doubts about the 
wisdom of aspects of the design of irrigation systems 
in Sri Lanka. In particular, the practice of having 
no intermediate storage between the main storage reser-
voir/canal and the farmer's field is widely questioned.10 
Cvi) One of the most basic problems is likely to be as intract-
able in Mahaweli as in existing schemes. Top end 
farmers receive abundant water in the early stages of 
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development. Typically, headworks and the upper 
reaches of canals are complete before the tail end 
is settled and needs water. Top end farmers and staff 
become accustomed to almost unlimited water issues, and 
farmers flood their fields and grow paddy. Often flood-
ing takes place on porous upland soils with heavy per-
colation losses. The expectations and habits developed 
at this stage by both staff and farmers make it difficult 
subsequently to issue less water and change to less 
thirsty, and more suitable but managerially more difficult 
crops. In consequence, less water is available for the 
tail end than planned, and there is a shortfall in the 
area irrigated. Parts of the H are of Mahaweli already 
appear locked into this syndrome. To break it is diffi-
cult. The problem is competition for water. Any effect-
ive solution probably requires two components: political, 
through representing the interests of tailenders in 
decision-making about water allocations; and managerial, 
in tightening discipline and effectiveness in the irri-
gation organisation. 
EXAGGERATED HOPES ABOUT FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS IN WATER 
USE HAVE BEEN A FEATURE OF ALL RECENT MAJOR IRRIGATION 
SCHEMES. IT IS UNLIKELY THAT THE LEVELS OF WATER USE 
EFFICIENCY REQUIRED ON MAHAWELI WILL BE ATTAINED WITH-
OUT RADICAL CHANGES IN OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT NOT 
YET IN PROSPECT. IN THAT EVENT THE LEAST DAMAGING 
OUTCOME WOULD BE A CURTAILEMENT OF THE PLANS FOR 
SETTLEMENT AND A REDUCTION IN THE ECONOMIC RETURNS. 
A WORSE OUTCOME WOULD BE FOR LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE 
TO BE SETTLED IN AREAS WHICH RARELY OR NEVER RECEIVED 
IRRIGATION WATER.11 
• . — -
6. CROP PRODUCTION 
It is intended to grow crops other than rice over a large fraction 
of the Mahaweli area. The most urgent reason for doing this is 
to reduce irrigation water requirements. There is still consider-
able scope for expanding production of grains, mainly rice, to 
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substitute for wheat imports. Sri Lanka was historically heavily 
dependent on imported rice. Gradual progress is being made to-
wards self-sufficiency in rice, and the target may well be 
attained in the next few years. However, the contribution of 
imported wheat flour to the total cerial intake has increased 
steadily in the last two decades, and imported wheat now accounts 
for about a quarter of total cereal consumption. There is con-
siderable scope for the expansion of local rice production to 
substitute for this. 
Whether or not Mahaweli settlers can be persuaded to grow pulses, 
vegetables, sugarcane, soya beans, oil seeds, onions, etc., instead 
of rice depends above all on their relative profitability. This 
is almost completely determined by government policy, above all 
by the extent to which it permits, through exchange rate and 
trade policies, the import of competing foreign produce. Between 
196 8 and 19 77 production of many of these non-rice crops grew 
rapidly because imports were severely restricted and producer 
prices remunerative. Since the present government liberalised 
foreign trade in 19 77, imports have severely cut the profitability 
and level of local production. The present government has taken 
steps to extend the system of guaranteed agricultural prices to 
non-rice crops and develop agro-processing industries in the 
Mahaweli area. It remains to be seen whether further support for 
the prices on non-rice crops will become necessary and whether a 
reliable marketing system can be created and maintained. 
7. ADMINISTRATION 
a. Management Structure 
It is the normal practice in Sri Lanka for areas under new settle-
ment schemes to be directly administered by the development agency 
during the period of construction and settlement, and then to 
revert to normal administrative status. While the authors are 
not aware of any explicit policy statement on this subject in 
relation to Mahaweli, it would seem to be the intention for the 
Mahaweli Authority to maintain very wide-ranging administrative 
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control of the project areas for a considerable period of time. 
More attention has been paid to establishing a permanent field 
administration network than has been the case in other projects. 
The three parallel lines of authority covering agriculture, 
community development and water management, are much fewer than 
in areas under ordinary administration. However one view is 
that three lines are too many, and that a unitary management 12 
structure is required at the local level. Whether the advant-
ages of such a change would outweigh the inevitable costs is a 
question which only experience could answer. 
b. Staffing 
On existing Dry Zone settlement schemes, there is a persistent 
problem that skilled and experienced people of all kinds, especially, 
but not only, in the public service, dislike to work and live there. 
They prefer the areas of the Wet Zone, expecially Colombo, where 
so many have their families, and where life is better in almost 
every sense. Public servants posted to the Dry Zone very often 
leave their families elsewhere, strive for transfer to a more 
congenial spot, and try to spend as much time as possible at 
home. Special incentives are not given to compensate for the 
disadvantages of Dry Zone postings. It is not clear how far the 
additional facilities and 'life' associated with Mahaweli develop-
ment will offset the disadvantages of the Dry Zone. 
8. LIVELIHOODS AND WELFARE 
The social consequences of existing settlement schemes have often 
seemed disappointing both to outside observers and to many of the 
settlers themselves. Some of the main concerns are: 
a. Social inequality 
Apart from differences in the assets which they bring with them, 
13 settlers start off on equal terms with the same amount of land. 
In the early settlement schemes this was five, acres of irrigated 
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paddy land and three acres of highland per family. This has 
been progressively reduced over the years as new land has become 
more scarce. The allocation for Mahaweli settlers is two and a 
half acres of irrigated land and half an acre of highland. In-
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equalities, however, quickly develop. Apart from what might 
be described as 'inevitable' causes of inequality, there seem 
to be two which operate in particular on settlement schemes. 
The first is the disadvantageous position of 'tailender' dis-
cussed above. The second is the almost complete dependence 
of the settler population on agriculture, and lack of altern-
ative employment. Crop failure can easily drive an allottee 
into a vicious spiral of debt and mortgaging land. Although 
the sub-division, renting and mortgaging of allotments is illegal, 
it is in practice - and quite sensibly - tolerated. Within a 
few years of settlement a substantial fraction of land seems 
to be cultivated by someone other than the allottee. The pro-
vision of non-agricultural employment should help alleviate 
this and other problems associated with the 'economic imbalance' 
of the settlement areas. The present government appears well 
aware of this issue, although it is not clear how far they are 
likely to be able to solve it. The settlement areas are rela-
tively remote from ports and large population concentrations. 
Paddy cultivation generates relatively little demand for ancil-
lary services such as processing, transport, retailing, etc. 
b. Exploitation 
The most notorious figures on some of the older settlement schemes 
are tractor owners who have gradually built up their power and 
assets such that they cultivate large holdings, amounting at 
least to dozens of acres. They are, however, especially prom-
inent in areas where land is relatively abundant - mortgages may 
be obtained easily and non-irrigated state land ploughed up 
(illegally} for rain-fed cultivation. These opportunities will 
be fewer in the Mahaweli areas because of the small allotments, 
dense populations, and the apparent trend in favour of small 
two-wheeled tractors as a result of the increasing cost of pur-
chasing four-wheelers. Measures to make use of buffaloes more 
attractive than tractors still remain very desirable. They have 
often been talked of, but little action has been taken. 
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c. The 'second generation problem' 
Second generation settlers on existing schemes may feel that they 
have a right to additional allotments to accommodate growing 
numbers. This problem may be even more acute under Mahaweli 
because of the small size of allotments. THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC 
INTEREST HOWEVER REQUIRES THAT THE DEMANDS OF SECOND GENERATION 
SETTLERS NOT BE HEEDED, AND THAT THEY BE ENCOURAGED TO DIVIDE 
THE LAND THEY HAVE AND FARM IT MORE INTENSIVELY. 
d. Landless labour 
Dry Zone allotments are not 'family farms' in the strict sense 
of the term. Almost all farmers, even those growing only two 
or three acres of rice, require additional hired labour in peak 
seasons. This requirement is considerable if they transplant 
paddy to increase yields, and will be even higher for many of 
the non-rice crops planned for the Mahaweli area. At present 
there is considerable seasonal migration of agricultural labour 
both between different parts of the Dry Zone and from Wet to 
Dry Zones. No attempt is made to accommodate landless labour-
ers on settlement schemes. They are not, for example, provided 
with house sites. Yet if the planned cropping pattern is 
achieved, much more hired labour will be required than is either 
used at present or anticipated officially.1^ 
THE PROVISION OF HOUSING AND SMALL VEGETABLE PLOTS FOR LABOUR-
ERS WOULD HELP MEET THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL LABOUR AND FREE THEM 
FROM DEPENDENCE ON EMPLOYERS FOR FOOD AND SHELTER. 
e. Drinking Water 
Provision of drinking water supplies - and domestic water more 
generally - is not good on existing schemes. Settlers depend 
heavily for both on canal water, at an obvious cost in ill-
health. The government seems to recognise this difficult prob-given 
lent. It has also been j . priority in the recent report on the Environ-
mental Impact of the Mahaweli Scheme. There are, however, doubts 
as to whether the planned piped system represents a cost-effective 
way of providing clean drinking water. 
THE DRINKING WATER PROBLEM IS URGENT, BOTH ON NEW AND EXISTING 
SCHEMES. 
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9. COSTS AND BENEFITS 
There appears to be little doubt about the economic feasibility 
of the power generation aspects of the Mahaweli project, espec-
ially the Kotmale and Victoria dams. However, assessment of 
the emigration and settlement aspects is not easy. Even before 
examining the economic feasibility analyses which have been con-
ducted there are two important points to consider: 
(i) There are good reasons for believing that many of the 
economic resources invested in Mahaweli could be better 
used in (a) rehabilitating existing irrigation schemes; 
and (b) in promoting agricultural production in the 
densely-populated Wet Zone, especially through small-
scale irrigation and drainage and crop breeding. The 
counter to this argument is that it is administratively 
and politically easier to start on something new. 
(ii) The results of any economic appraisal will depend 
heavily on the monetary value attributed to future 
production of rice and other food. Yet future world 
market food prices can only be guessed at, and there 
is a wide range of views as to the premium Sri Lanka 
ought to be prepared to pay for the relative security 
of self-sufficiency in cereals rather than dependence 
on imports. 
There are three main ways in which the benefit-cost analyses 
carried out are likely to produce figures which are too optimistic 
(i) Overestimates of the area that will be irrigated. In 
our view, many factors, including demands by top enders 
for liberal water supplies, flooding paddy on porous 
upland soils, and water losses during conveyance, often 
over long distances,are very likely to mean that much 
less than the planned area will receive water. 
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Cii) Overestimates of the number of families that can be 
settled. This follows from (i). In addition, espec-
ially in the absence of any other effective compensation 
for land taken for the project, it would not be surpris-
ing if influential local residents were receiving ad-
ditional irrigation plots in the names of relatives 
or children. To the extent that this occurs, it will 
further reduce the already rather small numbers who 
can be settled from the Wet Zone. 
(iii) Diversion of attention and resources from other opport-
unities for rural development. Mahaweli takes priority 
for finance, as well as for engineers, works super-
visors, and administrative support. Other projects can 
be expected to lag as a result. 
On the other hand, there are some actual or potential benefits 
to Sri Lanka which do not figure in conventional cost-benefit 
analysis: 
(i) Mahaweli attracts foreign concessional or grant funds 
which might not otherwise be available to Sri Lanka. 
(ii) Conventional social cost-benefit analysis underestim-
ates the value of a long-term shift upwards in pro-
duction through* a permanent physical change. Provid-
ing no long-term process like siltation becomes serious, 
Mahaweli should mean livelihoods and production for 
decades, if not centuries, ahead. 
(.iii) The priority accorded to Mahaweli, combined with donor 
interest and participation, could lead to changes in 
management and more efficient water allocation and use; 
and such changes might then spread to other irrigation 
schemes in the Dry Zone. We are, however, not too hope-
ful that this will occur. 
Civ) For all its problems and deficiencies, the Mahaweli 
Project has a historical and symbolic national import-
ance which technical appraisals tend to overlook. 
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Footnotes 
1. In round figures, two-thirds of the total population lives 
in one third of the surface area of the country. 
2.- The Dry Zone was the location of a highly-developed irrigation-
based Sinhalese civilisation between a thousand and two 
thousand years ago. This was based above all on the current 
cultural-cum-tourist sites of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. 
3. The Bowatenna power project is completed, work is underway 
on the Kotmale and Victoria power projects, and preparatory 
work for the Randenigala/Rantembe project is in progress. 
The acceleration in the demand for electricity since the 
liberalisation.of the economy in 1977 has made the completion 
of the Kotmale and Victoria dams more urgent. 
4. For the general background to this section see Chapter 1 of 
Moore and Wiclcremesinghe' s Agriculture and Society in the 
Low Country (attached). 
5. Although the rural population of Sri Lanka is often described 
as a 'peasantry', a majority, even outside the plantation 
sector, have either no land or such a small amount that it 
provides only a fraction of their income. A substantial 
proportion of these are poor rural labourers. 
\ 
6. A discussion of these issues and description of the experi-
ments may be found in some of the reports prepared by 
Huntings Ltd. in Colombo, consultants in the preparation of 
plans for System C. 
7. The situation is somewhat worse than these figures imply 
for, unlike those on current rates of use, the figures for 
the Mahaweli Project must be reduced to make some allowance 
for losses of water in long-distance transit between different 
water basins, and anyway already assume a certain amount of 
re-use of water. The figures used here are given in Sri 
Lanka, Mahaweli Gancia Development Program, Status Statement 3, 
prepared by the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Bank 
for the Sri Lanka Aid Group Meeting, Paris, May 1980. Prior 
to this major doubt about the' adequacy of the irrigation water 
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supply had been raised by an ex-public servant formerly 
involved in planning the Mahaweli Project - see G. Iriyagolle, 
The' Truth about the MahaWeli, Colombo, 1978. 
M. P. Moore," Approaches to Improving Water Management on Large-
Scale Irrigation Schemes in Sri Lanka Cattached). 
In addition to the reference given in note 8, see also M. P. 
Moore, The Management of Irrigation Systems in Sri Lanka; 
A Study in Practical Sociology (attached). 
See, for example, A. Laycock, Design of Cross Regulators and 
the Need for Intermediate Storage in Sri" Lankan Irrigation 
Schemes, (attached). 
Some such areas are to be found on many existing schemes. 
In the case of the two large schemes - Gal Oya and Uda Walawe -
they comprise a large fraction of the acreage intended to be 
irrigated. 
See A. Laycock Unit Management - A New Approach for Large 
Irrigation Projects in Sri Lanka, (attached) 
In the Mahaweli area existing cultivators are compensated for 
the land acquired from them, but no family is supposed to 
obtain more than a single allotment. There is some evidence 
that this rule has been breached, and that larger landholders 
have been allocated more than one new allotment. The 
extent of this practice is unknown. 
There were also so-called 'Middle Class Allotments' of 20-25 
acres in earlier schemes, but land is no longer allotted in 
this way. 
On the basis of information on labour use in other parts of 
Sri Lanka, it has been estimated, in relation only to paddy 
in the Mahaweli project, that "the input of hired labour per 
farm will probably have to be more than 50% higher than is 
at present envisaged". "For the whole project, it was found 
that even with quite an ambitious estimate of the number of 
days which an individual worker can work in a season, the 
(annual) requirement for hired labourers will, if output targets 
are to be met, be around 400,000 for the Accelerated 
Programme .... (R.S,Fieldson and J. Farrington, "Labour 
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Supply for Small Farm Development in the Dry Zone: Recent 
Patterns and Future Prospects", Paper presented at seminar 
on Research, Development and Rural Workers, Agrarian Research 
and Training Institute, Colombo, April 1980). 
Additional Sources of Information 
Apart from those sources cited in the footnotes the main 
authoritative document is the NEDECO Report. Huntings Ltd. in 
the Ministry of Mahaweli Development in Colombo can provide up-
to-date reports on the experiments related to irrigation and 
settlement which they are conducting The classic study of the 
Dry Zone and its development, still in many ways surprisingly 
relevant despite having been published in 1957, is B<,H0Farmer, 
Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon, Oxford University Press. 
The following publications of the Agrarian Research and Training 
Institute, Colombo, may be useful: 
(i) Research Study No. 23 (1979), An Analysis of the Pre-
Mahaweli Situation in the H4 and H5 Areas in Kala-Oya Basin 
(ii) On conditions in existing settlement schemes - Research 
Studies No. 29 (on the Minipe scheme) and No. 31 (on the 
Mahakandarawa scheme). 
Mo P.Moore 
R.Chambers 
Institute of Development 
Studi 
October 1980. 
